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Institutional drivers of environmental management accounting adoption  
in public sector water organisations 
 
Abstract 
Purpose – The paper examines the influences on adoption of environmental management 
accounting (EMA) in corporatised water supply organisations, from an institutional theory 
perspective, drawing on concepts of reflexive isomorphism and institutional logics. 
Design/methodology/approach – The primary research involves case analysis of three 
companies in the Australian water supply industry, drawing on interviews, internal 
documents and publicly available documents, including annual reports. 
Findings – Two key drivers for the adoption and emergence of EMA are: the emergence of a 
government regulator in the form of the Essential Services Commission (ESC); and 
community expectations with regard to environmental performance and disclosure.  The 
water organisations were found to be reflexively isomorphic, while seeking to align their 
commercial logic to ‘sustainability’ and ‘ensuring community expectations’ logics to 
legitimate adoption of EMA.   
Originality/value – The paper contributes to the literature by providing case study evidence 
of the intentions and motivations of management in adopting EMA, and the nature of that 
adoption process over an extended period.  Further, it provides empirical evidence of the 
applicability of reflexive isomorphism in the context of EMA and institutional logics.   
 
Keywords – Environmental management accounting, water supply organisations, 
institutional theory, stakeholders, reflexive isomorphism, institutional logics 
 
Paper type – Research paper 
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1. Introduction 
The emergence and development of environmental management accounting (EMA) in 
recent years has provided new approaches and tools for organisational management to 
track environmental performance.  However, Gibassier and Alcouffe (2018, p.1) concluded 
that “we still do not fully understand the potential contribution of environmental 
management accounting (EMA) to a transition toward sustainability”.  EMA systems may 
give visibility to environmental aspects of organisational activity that are otherwise often 
unclear in conventional management accounting systems (Burritt et al., 2002).  The use of 
EMA may also assist environmental performance improvement, particularly in relation to 
carbon emissions management and energy consumption (Hörisch et al., 2015; Qian et al., 
2018; Qian and Schaltegger, 2017).  It may also enhance accountability for organisational 
environmental impacts (Schaltegger and Burritt, 2000).  However, there is conflicting 
evidence from prior research relating to the outcomes and extended use of EMA with 
respect to environmental performance (see Christ et al., 2016; Hart and Ahuja, 1996; Phan et 
al., 2017).  This suggests that reasons other than environmental performance improvement 
may drive EMA adoption.   
 
Economic, technical, socio-cultural, socio-economic, or political rationales may underpin the 
organisational implementation of EMA. While multiple rationales may be drawn upon, prior 
research suggests that the most influential tends to be a desire to ensure economic 
efficiency (Herzing et al., 2012).  It has also been suggested that environmental accounting in 
general, and EMA in particular, can simultaneously play a role in improving environmental 
performance, environmental sustainability, and economic success (Ferreira et al., 2010). 
Additional drivers of EMA adoption have been found to include: regulatory influences 
(Kokubu and Nakajima, 2004); striving for legitimacy (Schaltegger and Hӧrisch, 2017); 
instigating organisational change for minimizing corporate environmental impacts 
(Larrinaga-Gonzalez et al., 2001); supporting environmental management (Burritt et al., 
2002); and enhancing organisational eco-efficiency (Burnett and Hansen, 2008).  Further, 
EMA systems can be used to activate the convergence of diverse environmental 
performance management systems within organisations, and to articulate internal 
performance management to external reporting (Burritt, 2012; Gibassier and Schaltegger, 
2015).   
 
The very limited prior research in the area focuses on describing the current state of 
implementation and highlighting contrasting outcomes relating to institutional and 
organisational structural elements that support or impede EMA adoption (Ferreira et al., 
2010; Qian et al., 2011; Christ, 2014). In contrast, recent management accounting literature 
has addressed the contribution of the broader field of management accounting to handling 
institutional changes and pressures.  For example, the adoption of new management 
accounting innovations enables organisations to deal with institutional pressures through 
negotiating multiple and conflicting objectives and adopting appropriate institutional logics 
from the organisational field (Gibassier, 2017; Jӓrvinen, 2016).  Institutional logics comprise 
formal and informal rules of action and interactions along with interpretations that guide 
and constrain decision makers (Thornton and Ocasio, 1999) to obtain legitimacy (Friedland, 
2012) within fields of activity.  The use of management accounting tools, particularly 
management control systems (MCS), helps organisations to strategically respond to 
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institutional pressures for sustainability (Norris and O’Dwyer, 2004; Tucker and Parker, 2015; 
Wijethilake et al., 2017).   
 
EMA research also has the potential to identify contingent and institutional factors for its 
adoption (Qian et al., 2011; Christ, 2014); however, empirical research has not investigated 
the interaction of these factors in practice.  Christ (2014) called for further case studies 
identifying potential drivers of EMA adoption in the water supply industry.  Existing EMA 
research is predominantly based on normative arguments (see Parker, 2005) and social 
system-based theories (Qian et al., 2011), which do not provide a theoretical explanation of 
the potential interactions of the significant drivers of EMA.   
 
The paper provides case study evidence of the interaction of potential drivers of EMA 
adoption.  To date, there has been limited research into the environmental accounting 
practices of public water organisations (but see Burritt, 2004; Cashman and Lewis, 2007; 
Moore, 2008, Egan, 2014, for example, in relation to the adoption of EMA more broadly – 
typically in the context of various forms of environmental reporting).  Recent literature on 
institutional change in the water sector, particularly in Australia, examines institutional 
dynamics and associated changes in practice (Brodnik et al., 2017).  This work explains the 
mutual shaping of technology, actors and institutions (Fuenfschilling and Truffer, 2016), 
highlighting “the importance of using a diverse range of institutional change mechanisms in 
a mutually reinforcing way to provide a strong foundation for change” (Werbeloff et al., 
2017, p.5845).  Research in this domain can further our understanding of “the paradigmatic 
core of a sector, which results from the co-evolution of institutions and technologies over 
time” (Fuenfschilling and Truffer, 2014, p. 772).  Broadly, the present paper responds to the 
call for management accounting research that examines “how a business organisation can 
organise and imagine its control system outside of its legal entity that is how can it lead and 
incentivise suppliers, customers and competitors to achieve sustainability” (Gibassier and 
Alcouffe, 2018, p.13). 
 
Since the 1990s, a series of governance, management, and related institutional 
arrangements have interacted with the implementation of various aspects of 
environmentally sustainable development in the Australian water industry (McKay, 2006).  
The evolution of practice change and ‘sustainability transition’ in this sector (Brodnik et al., 
2017; Werbeloff et al., 2017) shows a strong focus on dialogue with the community 
(Fuenfschilling and Truffer, 2014), which makes an examination of this setting especially 
interesting. 
 
Our research aims to address the domain identified above by examining the forces driving  
public water organisations to adopt EMA, and the interaction of the forces in the 
institutional field.  We utilise reflexive isomorphism and institutional logics as 
complementary perspectives.  The analysis draws on in-depth interviews with key 
organisational personnel, supplemented and extended by examination of the link between 
EMA adoption and EMA annual report disclosures.   
 
The key contributions of the paper are three-fold.  First, the paper contributes to an 
understanding of institutional pressures with regard to the adoption of EMA.  Second, 
Nicholls’ (2010) fourth type of isomorphic pressure, reflexive isomorphism, which has been 
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identified as the process of paradigm building in social entrepreneurship, is empirically 
tested in the context of EMA adoption.  Third, this paper contributes to the institutional 
logics literature, explaining how the logics of individual constituents may align with that of a 
dominant stakeholder; thus advancing empirical understanding of the interactions of 
multiple logics in the context of environmental accounting (see Narayanan and Adams, 
2017).   
 
2. Theoretical perspectives: Institutions, reflexive isomorphism and institutional logics 
Contemporary institutional theory, or new institutionalism1, provides a particularly useful 
frame within which to examine the motivations and drivers that impel organisations to 
adopt EMA.  It emphasises how the organisational need for both survival and legitimacy 
produces conformity with prevailing (institutionalised) practices and procedures, regardless 
of their efficacy or rationality in the organisational context (Meyer and Rowan, 1977).  
Institutional theory emphasises how such conformity may lead to “increased stability, 
legitimacy, and access to resources” (Ball and Craig, 2010, p. 283).   
 
By emphasising organisational ties to context, and the need for organisational 
accommodation to the environment, the institutional approach provides an alternative 
perspective to approaches that assume organisational action and success is a direct product 
of efficient control and direction.  Thus, action may be shaped and/or constrained by the 
environment in which an organisation operates, and adaptation to the organisational 
environment may produce legitimacy, particularly amongst key stakeholder groups.  This 
gives organisations access to both needed resources and socially desired approval – both of 
which are key to organisational survival.  These insights from institutional theory “are, in 
general terms, applicable to all organizations because all are embedded (to greater or lesser 
degrees) in their environments” (Zhang et al., 2014, p. 821).   
 
We draw on Scott’s (2008, p. 48) outline of an approach to institutional analysis that 
examines “regulative, normative and cultural-cognitive elements that, together with 
associated activities and resources, provide stability and meaning to social life”.  Through the 
formal or informal laws and rules, the regulative pillar plays a stabilising role that operates 
primarily through coercive mechanisms and sanctions for non-compliance, providing a 
formal legal basis of legitimacy.  The normative pillar provides a moral basis of legitimacy 
that relates to established values and norms that shape ends and means that are regarded 
as desirable and are therefore reinforced through social processes.  The cultural-cognitive 
pillar provides culturally supported and shared conceptions that provide orthodox meanings 
through which the world is interpreted and reproduced through mimicry and imitation. 
 
Institutional theory also provides “a productive frame within which to examine stability and 
change within organisations and systems and their relationship to broader social systems” 
(Zhang et al., 2014, p. 821).  By considering how organisations may be subject to influences 
from each institutional pillar, this approach draws analytical attention to the coercive, 
normative and mimetic isomorphic pressures (or influences) on organisations in context.  As 
Scott (2008, p. 85) points out, organisations ‘‘are penetrated by environments’’ such that 
institutional supports and constraints actually operate within organisational boundaries.   
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Institutional research has provided an important counterpoint to functionalist studies that 
focus on the rational economic direction and control of organisations, but many studies have 
focused primarily on mimetic and normative processes (and, more recently, on the work of 
institutional entrepreneurs), whilst often marginalising attention to coercive forces (Clegg, 
2010).  Because power, including the power of the state, is central to understanding society, 
the neglect of power in many studies leaves them lacking in terms of reference to how the 
“the wider social fabric” (Clegg, 2010, p. 5) influences change (see, also, Dillard et al., 2004; 
Lounsbury, 2008; Zhang et al., 2014).  Therefore, the present study is particularly attentive 
to how power, particularly state power, influences EMA adoption in water organisations2.   
 
Thornton and Ocasio (1999) define institutional logics “as the socially constructed, historical 
pattern of material practices, assumptions, values, beliefs, and rules by which individuals 
produce and reproduce their material subsistence, organize time and space, and provide 
meaning to their social reality” (p. 804).  Institutional logics enable and constrain social 
action and prescribe practices, which leads to organisational legitimacy because institutional 
logics and organisational interests and power are interdependent (Thornton et al., 2012).  
Institutional logics offer ways to deploy organisational action to enable an organisation to 
explore and then legitimate new practices (Thornton et al., 2012).  Hence, considering 
institutional logics is particularly apposite in the exploration of organisational behaviour to 
legitimate actions in the EMA field.   
 
The institutional logics approach has been frequently used in accounting research (see 
Lounsbury, 2008; Lander, Koene and Linssen, 2013), however, it has been less frequently 
used in an environmental accounting context (for exceptions, see: Larrinaga-Gonzelez and 
Perez-Chamorro, 2008; Lauesen, 2014).  Theoretical explanations applying the notion of 
institutional logics to EMA adoption are scarce (Lansiluoto, 2016).  However, there is a 
nascent understanding that institutional logics can transform public water service 
companies’ “implicit” CSR, moving towards “explicit” CSR through isomorphic pressures 
(Lauesen, 2014).  Environmental performance indicators used in water organisations tend to 
be legislation-driven rather than being adopted to improve environmental performance 
(Johnston and Smith, 2001).  Hence,  water service organisations may be expected to seek to 
legitimate their action in relation to legislative requirements through reflecting institutional 
logics. 
 
In investigating the interaction of organisational processes with factors that influence their 
actions in relation to institutional requirements, we also consider how organizations in 
emergent fields may seek to reflexively shape the emerging logics of the field.  Reflexive 
isomorphism, which “identifies a reflexive relationship between field and organisational-
level legitimation strategies … is particularly appropriate to emergent fields” (Nicholls, 2010, 
p. 612).  We consider how reflexive isomorphism works in the context of regulative, 
normative and cultural-cognitive institutional logics that may influence the organisation.  
Reflexive isomorphism is a particular legitimating strategy “in which organizations actively 
engage in processes that align field-level and internal logic to shape emergent institutional 
fields as closed systems of self-legitimation” (Nicholls, 2010, p. 617).  Thus, influential 
organisations may shape the legitimacy of an emerging field.  The operation of EMA in the 
context of increasing concerns about sustainability represents such an emergent field 
(Gibassier and Alcouffe, 2018; Christ et al., 2016; Schaltegger and Burritt, 2000).  In this 
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context, practices and processes in influential organisations have the potential to shape the 
further development of the field (Christ, 2014).   
 
In summary, traditional approaches to isomorphism examine how exposure to institutional 
pressures may cause organisations to become isomorphic in a given organisational field 
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1983).  Consideration of reflexive isomorphism extends the 
examination to consider whether and how organisations actively engage in shaping the 
legitimacy of the field “to reflect their own institutional logics and norms” (Nicholls, 2010, p. 
617). 
 
The close relationship between EMA and environmental performance improvement provides 
support for an initial premise in this study that regulatory (coercive) pressures to improve 
the environmental performance of water supply organisations are likely to present a key 
impetus for water supply organisations to adopt EMA.  Prima facie, therefore, it is expected 
that water authorities are likely to conform to formal mechanisms imposed by government 
in order to survive or grow, as argued by DiMaggio and Powell (1983), and legitimate their 
EMA adoption through the process of reflecting relevant institutional logics.  Further, 
consistent with the notion of reflexive isomorphism, water authorities may seek to align 
internal and field logics in a self-legitimating way.    
 
3. Research approach and method 
A qualitative case study research approach with multiple sources and analytical techniques 
was adopted in this research.   
 
3.1 Case studies  
Case studies were conducted on three government-owned organisations operating in the 
Victorian water supply industry – known, for the purposes of this study by the pseudonyms 
‘Pacific Water’, ‘Atlantic Water’ and ‘Central Water’.  Pacific Water is a regional urban (non-
metropolitan) water supply organisation; Atlantic Water is a regional water supply 
organisation providing services to cities, towns, and villages in its area of responsibility; and 
Central Water serves retail water businesses engaged in metropolitan water supply.  Table 1 
provides an indication of the size and significance of the three case organisations.  Pacific 
Water and Atlantic Water approximate the average size of Victorian water organisations, 
whereas Central Water is larger than average.   
 
<Insert Table 1 about here> 
 
Each of the case study organisations was sent a brief introduction to the project by email, 
explaining the main aims of the investigation, the possible involvement of organisational 
personnel, and the research methods to be adopted.  The email was sent to top executives 
who had a role in environmental and sustainability practices; for example, the general 
manager (GM) for sustainability, or the GM for environment.  The definition of EMA adopted 
and the requirements of participants were clearly articulated, as was a guarantee of 
confidentiality.   
 
For each of the case organisations, the research method included interviews with key 
personnel, conducted between December 2009 and July 2010.  This was supplemented by 
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analysis of selected key company documents and publicly available reports over a ten year 
period  (2001–2010) for each organisation.  This period was selected as appropriate for the 
study because during 2003–2009 the State of Victoria was in prolonged drought and water 
organisations were facing uncertain, and (in recent times) unprecedented circumstances.  
Hence, the data from this period was expected to be particularly suitable to reflect how 
organisations legitimate EMA adoption through the process of reflecting relevant 
institutional logics in an environment of uncertainty.   
 
3.2 Data sources and research methods 
3.2.1 Interviews 
The main source of case data was a series of 24 interviews with key organisational actors in 
the three case study organisations (see Table 2). 
 
<Insert Table 2 about here> 
 
Semi-structured interview questions were developed, based on the theoretical perspectives 
outlined above.  This included a series of open-ended questions that articulated the 
expectations of the study.  The interviews each lasted around one hour and were conducted 
in the interviewees’ workplace.  All interviews were tape-recorded and transcribed, except 
one, for which detailed notes were taken.   
 
3.2.2 Publicly-available documents and reports 
Various publicly available reports, including Annual Reports (which include environmental 
data for the Australian water sector) and other documents, such as environmental reports, 
sustainability reports, and water quality reports were examined in order to provide further 
background information and identify EMA initiatives and drivers.   
 
In order to examine the potential link between EMA adoption and annual report disclosure 
trends, EMA information and environmental performance disclosure in annual reports of the 
case organisations was analysed.  This approach was appropriate to the achievement of the 
research objectives, because past research has shown that environmental disclosure in 
annual reports is significantly correlated with the development of internal environmental 
management practices (Frost and Seamer, 2002).  Therefore, environmental performance 
disclosures may be closely associated with the development of a system that collects and 
disseminates information about the environmental aspects of corporate activities (that is, 
EMA), rather than straightforwardly or simply reflecting environmental performance.   
 
3.3. Analytical procedures 
3.3.1 Interview analysis 
To analyse the empirical data, several first level codes were derived from the theoretical 
framework and categorised according to research theme.  For construct validity, first level 
codes were defined based on the closest concept the code carried.  Coercive pressure, for 
example, was defined as capture of obligatory requirements of the organisation that have 
some role in EMA adoption.  This approach enabled consistent application by the 
researchers.  Once the first level codes were identified, each transcript was read and re-read 
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several times in order to identify text (sentences, paragraphs, phrases) connected to specific 
first level codes (Miles and Huberman, 1994).  ‘Chunks’ of text related to coercive pressures, 
for example, were collected from all transcripts and clustered under the ‘coercive pressure’ 
code.   
 
The NVivo qualitative research software package was used to assist in coding, identifying 
emergent pattern codes, and managing interview transcripts.  Summarised data was 
organised under first level codes, facilitating the development of new nested lower-level 
codes, movement of coding data, and organisation of codes.  Pattern codes were created 
and named to represent the meaning of new patterns identified.   
 
3.3.2 Content analysis 
Increasing amounts of environmental and social reporting in the Australian public sector 
“address in-house organisational requirements” (McDonald-Kerr, 2017, p. 49).  Christ and 
Burritt (2017) argued that for efficient water management, organisations must improve their 
internal management systems, “which then filters through to external reporting” (p. 228) 
(see also Christ, 2014).  Accordingly, in this research, annual report content analysis was 
used to identify general trends in disclosure in relation to EMA adoption, but, more 
importantly, to portray an overall sense of how the case organisations were reporting EMA-
related activity.  This analysis focused on the presence or absence of disclosure about 
identified EMA and corporate environmental performance items (rather than on the level of 
reported environmental performance itself). A dichotomous variable was used: if any 
disclosure occurred in relation to any of the items in a given year, a score of ‘1’ was given, 
otherwise ‘0’ (see Haque and Deegan, 2010)3.   
 
Prior research has found a growing trend for organisations to include both physical and 
monetary EMA information in external reports (Burritt et al., 2002).  Physical environmental 
information relates to organisational impacts on environmental systems, including “all past, 
present and future material and energy amounts that have an impact on ecological 
systems”, expressed in physical units such as weight and energy.  Monetary environmental 
information concerns the economic consequences of environmentally related impacts on 
the companies, including “past, present and future financial stocks and flows”, expressed in 
financial terms (Burritt et al., 2002, p.41).   
 
In determining the list of disclosure categories for physical or monetary EMA information, 
we drew on a number of relevant previous studies (Bartolomeo et al., 2000; Burritt et al., 
2002; Schaltegger and Burritt, 2000; Qian et al., 2011) and definitions of EMA (Burritt et al., 
2002).  Five broad categories were identified, of which four contained both physical and 
monetary information: 
 
1. Product output (physical and monetary); 
2. Non-product output (physical and monetary); 
3. Waste flows (physical and monetary); 
4. Indirect costs (monetary); and 
5. Externalities (physical and monetary). 
 
10 
 
In relation to types of environmental performance disclosure, the measurement models of 
Ilinitch et al., (1998) and Xie and Hayase (2007) were adapted, standardised and aggregated, 
and supported by other available environmental performance indicators, codes of practice, 
and environmental performance reporting guidelines.  Based on these sources, 
organisational environmental performance disclosure was categorised under four 
perspectives: 
 
1. Organisational system development; 
2. Stakeholder relations; 
3. Strategic; and  
4. Input–output.   
 
In the latter stages of the study, the interview data also guided this process.  A limited 
number of environmental performance disclosure items were added to the content analysis 
variables after commencement of the process of reviewing and coding disclosures from the 
annual reports.  A final list of 23 environmental performance disclosure items was developed 
under the four perspectives.   
 
4. Case analysis findings 
4.1 Annual report disclosures 
This section analyses patterns of EMA information and environmental performance 
disclosure by the three case organisations for a period of 10 years (2001–2010). The purpose 
of this analysis is to support the discussion of the interview data in conjunction with 
disclosure patterns.  Tables 3–5 present the results, summarising EMA information 
disclosure under each of the categories outlined in section 3.3.2.   
 
<Insert Table 3 about here> 
 
Table 3 shows an overall increase in physical EMA information disclosures.  The lowest levels 
of physical EMA disclosure for all three case organisations were in 2001, with scores of 0, 2, 
and 2; whereas the highest levels of disclosure were in 2008 (9 – Pacific Water), 2004 and 
2006 (8 – Atlantic Water) and 2007 and 2010 (6 – Central Water).   
 
<Insert Table 4 about here> 
 
Table 4 shows that across the three cases, only 9 out of a possible 21 items of monetary EMA 
information were disclosed.  Only one of these 9 items was disclosed prior to the mid-2000s, 
after which time disclosures increased with the inclusion of several new items of monetary 
EMA information in the ‘product output’, ‘waste flows’ and ‘externalities’ categories.  Hence, 
an increase in the monetary EMA information disclosure was evident across the period. 
 
<Insert Table 5 about here> 
 
As can be seen in Table 5, Pacific Water began disclosing environmental performance from 
an organisational system development perspective from 2004.  Atlantic Water and Central 
Water had begun disclosing some items under this perspective in the earlier period, but 
there was inconsistent disclosure.  Two of the three case organisations did not disclose any 
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items categorised as‘strategic’ until 2004, and the third (Central Water) disclosed only two 
items before this period.  Pacific Water disclosed only one item out of 8 under the input–
output perspective before 2004, compared with 4 items for Atlantic Water and 3 items for 
Central Water.  Although more items from the stakeholder perspective appeared to be 
reported during the earlier period, there were still a greater number of disclosures in the 
later periods.   
 
The trends in EMA information disclosures and environmental performance disclosures are 
presented in Figure 1, which highlights the upward trend in both these disclosure types 
across time.  Disclosure in these areas developed momentum in the case organisations in the 
mid-2000s.   
 
<Insert Figure 1 about here> 
 
In conclusion, the case organisations disclosed more EMA information and environmental 
performance items in later years.  Implications of these disclosure patterns are discussed in 
conjunction with analysis of the interview data in section 5.   
 
4.2 Pacific Water 
Pacific Water is a regional urban (non-metropolitan) water corporation that is managed like 
a private business and is funded primarily by customers.  The Annual Report corporate 
financial statement for the financial year 2009–10 showed that Pacific Water received about 
$60 million in tariffs and charges from customers, $36 million from borrowings, and $0.7 
million from capital contributed by the State Government.  These sources of funding set the 
scene for a prevailing commercial logic in Pacific Water, with customers clearly representing 
an important stakeholder group, with government also having an influential role through 
ownership and the power of law. 
 
During the period of this research, Pacific Water was under a formal contract known as a 
‘Statement of Obligation’ (SOO) with the government’s Department of Sustainability and 
Environment (DSE).  The SOO set out strategies for the corporation, including its primary 
objectives and reflected the DSE’s concerns about environmental protection:  
 
Within that Statement of Obligation it [SOO] talks about sustainability, reducing 
greenhouse gas, biodiversity all those things.  (GM Sustainability) 
 
The SOO required the environmental measurement and analysis, and consequently acted as 
a driving force for Pacific Water to adopt EMA:  
 
So at a strategic level it [SOO] is driving our business to monitor data, set targets… 
[so] the Statement of Obligations require[s] us records, [and] measurement [of] data; 
because without that you can’t meet that strategic position of the government 
driving us into sustainability, reduce greenhouse gas.  (GM Sustainability)4 
 
Hence, formal pressure for environmental improvement was exerted from the DSE, which 
had authoritative power over Pacific Water through the SOO.  Sustainability dimensions in 
the SOO, such as water conservation and reduction of greenhouse gas emissions, 
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necessitated that the organisation measure and analyse the environmental aspects of its 
operations to improve environmental performance.  Our analysis suggests that strategic 
decision making in Pacific Water was moderated to reflect the field-level sustainability logic 
(Thornton and Ocasio, 1999).  For example, recording and analysis of the nutrients in 
recycled water and matching them with customer needs helped Pacific Water to decide 
which nutrients to remove in the recycling process, resulting in minimisation of emissions for 
Pacific Water (and reduced electricity expense).  This reflects a process of isomorphism in 
that Pacific Water adapted to the wider sustainability logic of the field through its 
organisational strategic decision-making process (see Nicholls, 2010).   
 
Like the SOO, the Environment Protection Authority (EPA) licence of Pacific Water 
represented an obligatory requirement for the organisation, permitting it to operate.  This 
requirement was a driving force for the organisation to generate and analyse environmental 
information, because without this information it would be impossible to control the relevant 
related business activities: 
 
They [the EPA] do have a direct influence because the legal requirements are very 
powerful.  So if you don’t do the right thing they [the EPA] can penalise, and also you 
can create a negative public image if you get prosecuted or get a fine…the regulators 
can come and take a sample any time of the day.  So in order to make sure that you 
are not caught you have to proactively manage environment taking the 
environmental management accounting.  (Senior Environmental Engineer) 
 
The EPA thus exerted direct compliance pressures, through licensing, requiring the 
organisation to monitor and improve its own environmental performance and providing 
general impetus for considering environmental impacts. 
 
Just as established authorities may have direct ongoing influence over an organisation, a 
change in the regulatory framework under which public sector organisations operate could 
also present an impetus for EMA adoption.  The interviews revealed such a case in Pacific 
Water, in the form of the emergence of the State Essential Services Commission (ESC), 
commencing operations on 1 January 2002, as an independent economic regulator of 
essential utility services in electricity, gas, ports, and rail freight, extended in January 2004 to 
include water and sewerage services.  Every Victorian water organisation is required to 
report to the ESC against 67 specified key performance indicators.  The information provided 
to the ESC is audited to check for reliability.  The ESC monitors and publicly reports on the 
comparative performance of Victorian water businesses to facilitate “competition by 
comparison” among the water companies (Manager Assets).   
 
The Board of Pacific Water wanted to be ranked in the top five 5 performers.  Thus 
motivated, several actions were taken in relation to several environmental KPIs (such as 
emission reductions and increase in recycled water usage), for example, accounting for 
recycled water (Managing Director, MD)).  Therefore, the ESC-mandated comparative 
performance report provided an impetus for improving performance through EMA adoption.   
 
Regulatory instruments designed to protect the interests of customers could produce 
adverse impacts on the company if customers are not satisfied, which would imply an 
institutional logic of ensuring community expectations.  Hence, in addition to government, 
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customers are key stakeholders as they possess all three vital stakeholder attributes (power, 
legitimacy and urgency) that lead firms to exert more effort in managing the stakeholder 
relationship (Mitchell et al., 1997; Kamal et al., 2015).  Pacific Water utilised several 
mechanisms to remain cognisant of customer perspectives, including customer contact 
centres, annual surveys, community reference groups, and a customer advisory group.  From 
these inputs, an annual report was produced, including information about customer 
environmental expectations as well as their understandings of the organisation’s 
environmental initiatives, such as awareness of water restrictions.  This information would 
be fed-back into operational and strategic decision making.  This activity shows how the 
‘ensuring community expectations’ institutional logic was adopted and adapted in a 
reflexively isomorphic way, in that Pacific Water projected its own initiatives and activities 
into the field, which then became, at least in part, a measure of legitimacy and standard by 
which they judged their own performance.   
 
Many interviewees referred to the feedback from customers through the three customer 
reference groups in different locations in the region, as well as from the annual customer 
survey and monthly surveys.  For example: 
 
… what comes out of the… [customer feedback] is our very early adoption of things - 
like our very early adoption of greenhouse strategy.  We are the first water 
corporation [preparing] the greenhouse strategy.  We got that because we get that 
information coming in from our customers.  (GM Commercial Services)  
 
So they [community] have an expectation that we don’t spill sewage down the 
stream, they have an expectation that we manage our scarce water carefully.  We 
don’t let a burst water main go for hour after hour after hour.  So my personal view 
is the man in the street has an expectation, and those expectations tend to drive the 
regulators, you know, ‘what’s a reasonable position in terms of meeting our 
obligation and then setting targets, which continuously improve?’.  (GM 
Sustainability)  
 
It’s [accounting for recycled water] also driving the fact that we are a strong 
environmental performer.  (MD) 
 
The above quotes reflect Pacific Water engagement in certain processes, such as minimising 
electricity and water wastage, which reflect its commercial logic.  Key elements of this logic 
and its playing out in these processes, would be projected into the institutional field via 
customer engagement and related activities.  This demonstrates reflexive isomorphism, 
which is reinforced when Pacific Water defines and explains its own efforts in this realm as 
being ‘in line with community expectations’. This process indicates a tendency to align a 
commercial logic with a community expectations logic that is, itself, shaped by governmental 
and regulatory influences, thus legitimising its EMA adoption. 
 
The annual report content analysis (see Table 5) supports the above finding.  The decade-
long drought, which became severe in the mid-2000s, drove the business to begin potable 
water substitution.  Although there was no regulatory performance requirement for this, 
Pacific Water was active in this area to ensure supply security with its very low level of water 
storage.  The organisation disclosed potable substitution consistently from 2004, with the 
aim of communicating with the public that Pacific Water was a strong environmental 
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performer.  Again, this demonstrates reflexive isomorphism within institutional logics that 
are influenced by stakeholder (customer and government) expectations, even as the latter 
are themselves influenced by Pacific Water’s own engagement with its stakeholders. 
 
The above discussion of the Pacific Water case highlights that the dominant internal logics of 
government were directed towards ensuring environmental sustainability and meeting 
community expectations.  The government transposed its logic to water supply organisations 
through the SOO, EPA licence requirements, and reporting requirements to the ESC.  
However, Pacific Water’s dominant internal logic was a commercial logic, with the 
organisation managed like a private business, even though dealing with public goods.  
Analysis of the interviews demonstrates that Pacific Water aligned its commercial logic with 
the institutional logic relating to its customer stakeholders through a differential mechanism: 
modifying the existing system and adopting a new system within it (see e.g.  Thornton, 2002; 
Rautiainen, Urquía-Grande and Muñoz-Colomina, 2017).  Thus, Pacific Water responded to 
different institutional pressures in different ways: 
 
1. To the SOO – by undertaking water conservation measures and reducing greenhouse gas 
emissions. 
2. To the EPA – by adopting the EPA licence requirements.  
3. To the ESC – by modifying its existing environmental reports.  
4. To government and community expectations – by incorporating community groups in 
decision-making processes.   
 
The concept of reflexive isomorphism highlights how EMA adoption in Pacific Water was 
legitimated in the context of SOO requirements, EPA licensing, ESC reporting, adoption of a 
greenhouse strategy, and incorporation of community groups in its decision-making 
processes.   
 
Pacific Water also aligned its commercial logic with broader community expectations and 
sustainability logics of government by incorporating community interests in its commercial 
activities.  For example, during the decade-long drought, Pacific Water initiated potable 
water substitution to ensure supply security for the community.  Hence, broader 
institutional logics shaped the decision of individual constituents in the organisational field 
(Pacific Water) to align their own logic to the broader one, in order to make their actions or 
efforts legitimate (see Ocasio, 1997).   
 
4.3 Atlantic Water 
Atlantic Water provides water and sewerage services to 38 cities, towns, and villages in its 
regional area of operations, serving an estimated population of 113,000 people in an area of 
approximately 20,000 square kilometres5.  It is a government-owned corporation, and 
environmental performance comes under close government scrutiny.   
 
The EPA influences water authorities through the Environmental Protection Act 1970 
(EPAct).  This is a coercive institutional influence that it requires Atlantic Water to emphasise 
the environmental impact of its operations.  Additionally, the EPA represented a driving 
force for Atlantic Water to adopt EMA during the period under examination in the form of 
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the corporate licence requirement to have an environmental management system (EMS).  As 
a part of an annual compliance statement, Atlantic Water had to report on EMS outcomes.   
 
Responding to these regulatory influences, Atlantic Water partnered with the EPA to 
develop a new corporate licence, moving beyond compliance aiming to achieve improved 
sustainability outcomes. This reflected an active engagement by Atlantic with institutional 
influences in its field.  Hence, the existence of the EMS in Atlantic’s corporate licence 
represented a coercive pressure that influenced the adoption of EMA, but the precise 
manner of the response was shaped by reflexive isomorphism.   
 
Atlantic Water also actively engaged in other ways with EMS-based processes that shaped 
the legitimacy of EMA adoption within the organisation, whilst reflecting its own commercial 
logic.  For example, the EMS included competency requirements, and Atlantic Water would 
prepare a competency inventory across its staff.  This would then be compared with the 
regulatory requirements and the strategic goals of the organisation in order to develop 
training programs.  EMA information would feed into the training programs to optimise 
training goals by identifying environmental problems and means to overcome them.  The 
Chief Financial Officer described the usefulness of EMA for training treatment plant staff 
whose work revolved around biological process information generated through EMA.  This 
information was used to train staff to optimise plant operations, minimising environmental 
impact and optimising operational costs.  This reflects the interweaving of the sustainability 
logic with Atlantic’s commercial logic.   
 
Under the EPAct, the EPA implements and enforces the National Pollutant Inventory, 
National Environment Protection Measure (NPI NEPM) on behalf of the Victorian 
Government through the Industrial Waste Management Policy (National Pollutant Inventory) 
(IWMP NPI), which came into operation on 6 October 1998.  Under the IWMP NPI, an 
industry facility must report to the NPI if the emission or transfer-in waste of any of 93 
defined substances exceeds the NPI reporting threshold.  The NPI NEPM requires reporting 
of greenhouse gas emissions, and the National Greenhouse and Energy Reporting Act 2007 
(NGER Act) requires the collection, reporting, and dissemination of information related to 
greenhouse gas emissions and energy consumption and production.   
 
Thus, the NGER Act and the NPI NEPM are a direct impetus for the capture, understanding 
and reporting of NPI substances, including greenhouse gas emissions.  Responding to this 
coercive influence, Atlantic Water reported its greenhouse gas emissions through the NPI: 
 
…we still report it [Greenhouse data] through the Pollutant Inventory [because]…we 
do not make that trigger level at the moment [set by the NGER Act]” (Manager 
Sustainability and Environment).   
 
Organisations are likely to become environmentally proactive in considering environmental 
impacts in corporate activities if there is a perceived environmental concern from customers 
(Green et al., 1996).  Customers’ environmental concerns came to the attention of the 
Atlantic Water during 2003–2009, when the State was in prolonged drought.  As was the 
case with Pacific Water, during this drought there was much interest from Atlantic’s 
customers in accessing re-used (recycled) water. 
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A key part of the process through which Atlantic Water discerned customer environmental 
concerns was the engagement of the community in project implementation.  The 
organisation established representative committees in several towns that had been involved 
in environmental monitoring, which was initially more focused on pumping costs and 
electricity generation.  As a part of its project implementation process, Atlantic Water 
presented new project proposals to the community and sought feedback, which brought 
broader customer environmental concerns to attention.  Thus, Atlantic actively considered 
customer concerns and responded to them as a normative institutional influence.   
 
There was also an initiative in Atlantic Water to influence customer perceptions of value for 
money, showing how influences from the normative institutional pillar were blended with 
reflexive isomorphism.  The Manager Sustainability and Environment acknowledged the 
importance of communication between customers and the organisation when addressing 
these issues:  
 
Customers need to understand what we do…[All the business activity] comes with a 
whole stack of prices and I don’t mean just dollar prices, I mean funding the 
environmental costs as well… If we want to do anything major that will increase the 
price of water we go back to the ESC.  The Essential Services Commission controls 
what we can and can’t charge for water.  So if we go back to the Essential Services 
Commission and say we want to put water up to $5 a kilolitre we better have a very 
good understanding of our customers’ capacity to pay, desire to pay, acceptance of 
the new product range and to be able to demonstrate material benefit, or they’ll just 
kick it out.  And a good example of that is in the last funding period [other water 
company in Victoria] went to the ESC for a hundred percent green power that 
would’ve raised water prices to about $3 or $4 a kilolitre.  And ESC said no, they said 
there’s no obligation for it and there’s no customer desire to have it…So the 
customer relationship around what we charge for all our initiatives, not just the 
delivery of water and wastewater services, is very important. 
 
Significantly, this quote shows how normative and reflexive institutional processes were part 
of Atlantic’s engagement with the regulatory sphere of influence.  It shows how the playing-
out of institutional forces is often activated in a complex web of engagement, rather than in 
straightforward processes of institutional adaptation.  
 
Community expectations for environmental improvement also provided an important 
incentive for EMA adoption.  Atlantic Water perceived that the adoption of EMA would 
enhance the credibility of its sustainability initiatives.  It was believed that the generation of 
environmental information and its use in business decisions could convey a message to the 
community that the organisation is capable of handling environmental uncertainty (see 
Gray, Owen and Adams, 2009; Gray, Adams and Owen, 2014).  Further illustrating the 
processes of reflexive isomorphism, the Manager Sustainability and Environment stated:   
 
[Atlantic Water] is recognised for being proactive in this [enhancing credibility] 
sphere, it’s recognised for what it is doing in terms of… carbon accounting, it is 
recognised as a go-to organisation on issues [of] water, and that has been 
heightened, I guess, by the climatic experiences we have had in the last five years, 
but it is recognised that it has the skills and capacity to answer these questions. 
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Atlantic Water engaged in the Victorian Government community engagement framework for 
emission reductions and enhancement of renewable energy production by improving 
understanding of potential impacts of climate change on its water systems. This type of 
engagement was regarded as enhancing Atlantic Water’s credibility: 
 
We need to have that information so we can be transparent.  We’re fairly open with 
our business so most of the information we’ve got now is just public knowledge, 
people can get access to it, we put it in annual reports.  I’m sure the Board’s keen to 
promote its position as a responsible water authority, so it certainly helps to make … 
confirm our role in being a sustainable business.  (Strategy and Development 
Manager) 
 
The above findings indicated that the company Board wanted to confirm Atlantic’s 
community role, demonstrating its adherence to expectations for a sustainable water 
authority.  In this respect, the organisation sought to proactively enhance its community 
credibility regarding the handling of environmental uncertainty, which led it to adopt EMA 
(Larrinaga-Gonzalez et al., 2001).  Thus, through its engagement with institutional influences, 
Atlantic Water also projected its internal legitimating agenda in terms of EMA adoption, 
including increasing recycled water, funding environmental costs, and improving greenhouse 
gas performance/footprint.  Atlantic Water actively engaged in processes, such as 
community engagement in project implementation process and attending in community 
forums, to align with a community expectations logic, while continuing to reflect its own 
commercial logic (including reducing electricity expense and increasing recycled water 
revenue).   
 
The reflexive isomorphism perspective highlights how EMA adoption in Atlantic Water was 
legitimated through its response to the forces emanating from customer and government 
institutional logics.  The specific forces that derived from the sustainability logic of the 
government included the EPAct environmental protection policies and associated EPA 
licence, and the NGER Act.  Atlantic Water responded to these forces by implementing EMS 
in its corporate licence and reporting to the NPI.  The other forces that derived from the 
community expectations logic related to satisfying environmental concerns.  Atlantic Water 
responded to this influence by engaging the community in its project implementation 
processes, particularly those relating to environmental monitoring, community forums, and 
reporting potential climate change impacts on the water system. 
 
4.4 Central Water 
Central Water is not directly involved in providing water and sewerage services to customers 
in its region; these services are rendered by three retail water companies.  Central Water 
operates and manages 157,000 hectares of protected catchments, 10 water storage 
reservoirs, approximately 1000 kilometres of water distribution mains, 65 service reservoirs, 
and 42 water treatment plants.  Rainwater is harvested in catchment areas and stored in 
reservoirs, from where water flows to service reservoirs that provide short-term storage (1–
2 days) to ensure constant water supply.  From there, water flows through smaller pipe 
systems to retail water businesses, which then supply water to retail customers.  Similarly, 
sewage is collected from retail customers by the retail water companies and passed through 
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to Central Water’s sewerage system.  Central Water then treats the sewage in its two 
treatment plants before discharging and/or recycling it.   
 
Other than providing water and sewerage services through its retailers, Central Water is also 
responsible for the management of the waterways in its region, encompassing: managing 
stormwater and floodplains; planning infrastructure to service urban development; and 
protecting and enhancing the health of the region’s rivers, creeks, and wetlands.  In 
managing the waterways, Central Water must collaborate with 17 local government 
authorities that manage the local drains feeding into the regional drainage system.   
 
Central Water charges the retail water companies for the provision of its services, and these 
charges flow through to customers via the retail water companies.  Central Water also 
directly charges a property rate to all owners in its waterways jurisdiction.  Both sets of 
charges (to the retail water companies and to the property owners) must be approved by 
the ESC – a process that is deigned to protect the interests of individual customers against 
the monopoly powers of the service provider.   
 
Central Water is financially dependent on the retail water company payments and customer 
rates.  However, it has no control over the supply of water to the retail companies, because 
they are entitled to supply security under a bulk entitlement agreement.  Therefore, Central 
Water is ultimately dependent on government for its resources.   
 
Revenue collections from retail water companies provided the largest share of Central 
Water’s revenue during the period under study.  Interviewee comments showed that Central 
Water kept its retailers reasonably well informed about environmental initiatives, because 
the environmental costs were carried forward to retail water companies.  Moreover, the 
retail water companies needed to convince their customers of the community benefits of 
environmental costs incurred by Central Water.  Interviewees also pointed out that the 
organisation wanted to progressively bring customer values into line with its sustainability 
issues, although they did not clearly explain how this would be achieved.  Hence, customers’ 
preferences seemed to have been influential in the inclusion of environmental aspects in 
corporate decisions, but Central Water had a clear desire to influence customer preferences 
and understandings, demonstrating a reflexively isomorphic process. 
 
The EPA imposes environmental obligations on Central Water through the EPAct, issuing the 
operating license.  The Act includes sustainability principles that require Central Water to 
take into account financial and environmental costs.  The EPA operating licenses aimed to 
minimise environmental impacts, requiring, for example, monitoring the flows of sewerage 
discharged into waterways.  This regulatory process generated much environmental 
information, as the organisation needed to be assured that it was compliant. 
 
Another instrument issued through the Water Act was Central Water’s SOO, which (as with 
Pacific Water) guided the organisation’s business conduct.  It included sustainability 
principles requiring Central Water to fulfil core water, sewerage, waterways, and recycled 
water functions in a sustainable way.   
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To meet sustainability obligations the organisation was required to develop programs to 
respond to climate change, improve the natural environment, use resources efficiently, and 
minimise everyday environmental impacts.  These obligations required Central Water to 
generate information about environmental aspects of its activities and use that information 
in business decisions.  The Manager Corporate Strategy explained that Central Water had to 
meet these sustainability criteria while submitting a water plan to the government every 
three to five years – requiring environmental and financial information.  Firms tend to 
develop environmental performance measures to meet compliance requirements (Johnston 
and Smith, 2001), hence, a clear link can be drawn between the embedding of sustainability 
principles in the SOO and the adoption of EMA by Central Water.   
 
Environmental considerations had the utmost priority in the regular business activities of 
Central Water: 
 
The reasons would be if we don’t do it ourselves properly somebody will make us do 
it anyway. (Project Manager, Environmental Regulation and Reporting).   
 
The EPA could prosecute the organisation for any environmental degradation resulting from 
Central Water’s business operations.  Hence, to avoid the resultant loss of reputation Central 
Water would consider environmental impacts in business decisions: 
 
We assess the environmental impacts of … [business activities] and manage that so 
that we don’t break the law or create such a problem in the community that we lose 
our reputation.  (Project Manager, Environmental Regulation and Reporting) 
 
It is evident that the EPA imposed environmental obligations on Central Water through the 
EPAct and the issuing of licenses.  A clear link can be drawn between the embedding of 
sustainability principles in the SOO and EMA adoption.  Thus, a combination of perceived or 
potential (or likely) coercive pressures and a normative sense of community expectations 
were significant in the development of EMA within Central Water.  These perceptions, and 
the notion of legitimacy, attached to the general community-directed endeavours of Central 
Water rather than being directed towards particular stakeholder groups.  Complementing 
this finding in relation to community norms, prior work has also found an influence of 
community expectations on firms’ environmental practices (e.g.  Qian et al., 2011).   
 
It is evident from the above analysis that, although Central Water’s business involves 
“natural capital” (see Barton, 1999) in the form of water, its driving motive sat squarely 
within a commercial logic.  However, the organisation also found the need to align its 
commercial logic with sustainability and community expectations logics, emanating from 
regulators and customers, in order to legitimate organisational and managerial practices, 
while progressively seeking to bring customer logics into line with its own.  Illustrating 
Central Water’s engagement with the regulatory sphere, the Manager, Corporate Strategy 
explained the importance of environmental information to legitimate its action to 
regulators: 
 
Having that environmental information available means that they all have a common 
understanding of where we are at, and…having that information helps us to set our future 
direction as well.   
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The GM Business services also pointed to this endeavour to ensure alignment between an 
internal commercial logic and regulatory institutional influences: 
 
The environmental data that we capture and analyse supports our business decision-making 
in the short term and long term, and we can say that’s environmental data we need to help 
us achieve that part of our strategic objective or a business objective, and then that relates 
to our longer term strategic objectives.  The capturing of environmental data and lots of 
other data is fundamental to our ability to make decisions around how we’re going to 
achieve our strategic objectives and then support the business case for them.  (GM Business 
Services) 
 
Organisational practices are structured by ‘dominant logics’ and elicit an isomorphic 
responses (Greenwood et al., 2010; Lounsbury, 2007).  Interviewees of Central Water 
identified the relevant institutional forces: the EPA licence, sustainability principles in their 
SOO, and fear of prosecution in case of environmental degradation (and consequent 
reputational loss).  Central Water responded to these forces by monitoring flows of 
sewerage discharge into waterways, and preparing a water plan encompassing 
environmental and financial information.   
 
In this case, the concept of reflexive isomorphism helps to explain how EMA adoption in 
Central Water was also legitimated by responding to the forces on the organisation that 
relate to the institutional logics of dominant stakeholders whilst it sought to influence the 
shaping of those same logics, especially in the customer realm.  Central Water progressively 
brought its environmental focus and customer values into alignment. This case illustrates 
multiple logics at work in the organisational field (see Narayanan and Adams, 2017).   
 
5. Discussion 
DiMaggio and Powell’s (1983) explanation of isomorphism focuses on organisational 
homogenisation processes rather than exploring the process of aligning an individual 
organisation’s logic to that of the field.  We find that water service organisations, as might 
be expected, seek to legitimate their own position and actions by reflecting institutional 
logics that are centred on legislative requirements.  We have also investigated the 
interaction of the organisational processes with other institutional influences, demonstrating 
a legitimating strategy in which organisations actively seek to align field-level and internal 
logics (Nicholls, 2010).  This is evident both in their own adaptations and in the way they 
seek to influence how logics develop in the field and emerge, in turn, as factors that can 
provide the organisation with legitimacy.   
 
The three case studies demonstrate how the adoption of EMA is subject to important 
coercive pressures, as summarised in Table 6.  There are four key factors common across the 
cases: (1) sustainability focus in the Statement of Obligation (SOO); (2) environmental 
obligations mandated through the EPA; (3) the emergence and influence of the ESC; and (4) 
reporting to the NPI under the NGER Act 2007.  These key factors provided the means of 
transposing the broad sustainability logic at the level of government to the constituents of 
the organisational field (of particular interest here: the three water companies).  Individual 
water organisations aligned their own commercial logic with the dominant stakeholder 
sustainability logic through their responses to these key regulatory/coercive factors.   
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<Insert Table 6 about here> 
 
Whether an organisation should incorporate EMA into its decision-making structure is 
generally regarded as an internal management concern.  However, the operation of 
institutional isomorphism, as shown here, suggests that water organisations conserve water, 
reduce greenhouse gas emissions, implement EMS, refine existing environmental reporting, 
and report through the NPI in order to align their commercial logic to the sustainability logics 
in the institutional field.  This is highlighted in Table 7.   
 
<Insert Table 7 about here> 
 
The case studies also highlight that the key coercive force was regulatory change since mid-
2000s (during this period the drought became severe), highlighted in Table 8.  This produced 
increased requirements for certain environment-related disclosures, acting as a further 
impetus for EMA adoption. 
 
<Insert Table 8 about here> 
 
Analysis of the interview data highlighted how regulatory changes in the mid-2000s directly 
influenced EMA adoption, and the case study water organisations responded to regulatory 
changes in ways that legitimated their EMA adoption.  The annual report content analysis 
found an upward trend in EMA and environmental performance disclosures over the same 
period (see Figure 1).  The case analysis found that during this period comparative 
performance reporting about the environmental performance of water companies, issued to 
the public by the regulatory authorities provided an impetus, through initiating ‘competition 
by comparison’ among water companies, to improve performance through EMA adoption.   
 
Prior research has shown how similar requirements put direct pressure on local government 
to collect EMA information (Qian et al., 2011.  Similarly, interviewees from Atlantic Water 
pointed to the particular reporting requirements of the NPI as a coercive force for 
measuring, monitoring, and reporting environmental impacts.  Therefore, there was a 
synergistic relationship between mandated reporting requirements and EMA adoption.  
While Pacific Water and Central Water were subject to the same legislative requirements, 
the interview data did not provide evidence that this was a prominent motivating factor in 
their EMA adoption.  In these cases, other institutional factors were more important, such as 
the emergence of the ESC and embedding of sustainability principles in SOOs.  However, the 
content analysis of environmental performance reporting in annual reports of these 
organisations showed a similar trend to Atlantic Water (see Table 5). 
 
A comparison of the average score of the four perspectives included in Table 5 shows that 
the highest environmental performance disclosure related to the input–output perspective 
(36.58%).  This reflects regulatory reporting requirements of water authorities by the DSE, 
EPA, and ESC.  For example, the environmental performance indicators reported to the ESC 
cover sewage treatment and compliance, the recycling of effluent, bio-solid reuse, and 
greenhouse gas emissions, most of which relate to the input–output perspective.   
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The target audience of water company annual reports include government and community 
stakeholders.  So, water companies’ regulated reporting requirements were also reflected in 
annual reports directed at broader stakeholder groups.  The finding that the highest level of 
disclosure across the three cases relates to the input–output perspective indicates that 
operational performance primarily focused on environmental performance evaluation, and 
water companies actively embraced the sustainability logic influenced by government and 
community (see Brodnik, Brown and Cocklin, 2017). Thus, the case organisations measured 
and monitored environmental performance to achieve and report mandated performance 
criteria, which, in turn, acted as a driver for EMA adoption.   
 
The four coercive pressures for the adoption of EMA originated from sustainability 
compliance requirements and related reporting requirements of the complex regulatory 
framework faced by the organisations.  It is significant to note that all of the case 
organisations did not feel identical coercive pressures from the SOO, EPA, ESC, and NPI, even 
though they were subject to the same regulatory framework (see Table 6).  Hence, it is 
reasonable to conclude that, when the dominant stakeholders seek to impose their 
particular institutional logics, institutional influences and resultant institutional changes are 
not equally felt by individual constituents in the field; the adoption of different internal 
mechanisms for improved environmental performance may be evident.   
 
The nature of the water industry is such that there is a resource dependency between the 
ESC and water authorities6.  The ESC also mandates environmental performance in key areas 
concerning sewage treatment, recycling of effluent, bio-solids reuse, and greenhouse gas 
emissions.  Hence, while the water organisations reflexively legitimate their EMA adoption 
through their actions in light of different institutional pressures (further discussed below), 
we conclude that the coercive pressure from the ESC was particularly potent in the case 
organisations.  This is because they were strongly constrained by the ESC both in the 
coercive realm and in terms of availability of resources.  Water authorities undertook steps 
to achieve regulated performance in order to ensure a smooth flow of resources, as the 
inclusion of environmental costs in approved pricing changes was dependent on 
environmental initiatives.  Hence, a clear link was evident between resource dependency on 
the ESC and EMA adoption. 
 
Beyond the regulatory institutional pillar, our findings also suggest that customers were a 
key stakeholder group influencing EMA adoption.  Non-financial factors identified with 
increasing customer salience included: (1) valuing customers’ feedback in strategic decisions; 
(2) aligning organisational responses to sustainability issues and customer values; and (3) 
understanding customers’ environmental concerns.  We found the traditional institutional 
influences supplemented by an additional element in that the case organisations legitimated 
EMA adoption through processes of reflexive isomorphism.  Together, the key factors above 
reflect the ‘ensuring community expectations’ logic.  Particularly in terms of the second 
factor, the water companies demonstrated reflexive isomorphism in the manner in which 
they engaged with community groups, substituted potable water, attended community 
forums, and similar processes (see Table 8).  The endeavour to align commercial logic and 
dominant stakeholder ‘ensuring community expectations’ logics was warranted by 
regulatory expectations that reflected a coercive institutional pressure: “Sometimes the 
regulators are seen as the customers’ representative on some of the [environmental] issues” 
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(Chief Financial Officer, Atlantic Water).  However, it is also an illustration of the manner in 
which the organisation projected its own internal logic out into the field with which it was 
institutionally engaged (that is, reflexive isomorphism). 
 
A two-way dialogue with customers was in place in all three cases, through which the case 
organisations enacted processes of reflexive isomorphism.  For example, during the 2000s 
decade, when the state suffered continuous drought, interviewees noted an interest from 
the customers in accessing recycled water and seeking opportunities to reduce potable 
water demand by increasing recycled water use, even as corporate engagement with 
customers sought to influence the nature of the customer response.  Such two-way dialogue 
with stakeholders has an impact on the nature and content of environmental reporting 
(Adams, 2002) and may support the emergence of logics that value environmental 
sustainability, which “focus on community base value and arrangements as well as belief in 
trust and reciprocity” (Fuenfschilling and Truffer, 2014, p. 779). 
 
In summary, varied institutional influences worked together to shape EMA adoption.  As 
Dillard et al.  (2004, p. 509) state: “By designing a formal structure that adheres to the norms 
and behaviour expectations in the extant environment, an organisation demonstrates that it 
is acting on collectively valued purpose in a proper and adequate manner”.  The present 
study also shows how this process may be supplemented by reflexive isomorphism whereby 
the organisation actively seeks to shape values in the emergent filed, including through its 
own processes of responding to these values.  The case organisations in this study 
incorporated environmental aspects of corporate activities into business decisions, through 
EMA adoption, in order to bring legitimacy to their efforts to sustainably operate within a 
commercial logic.   
 
6. Conclusion 
This paper provides a deeper understanding of the interplay of drivers of EMA in the 
Australian water industry.  The analysis shows how water organisations align and adapt their 
existing institutional logics with influential institutional logics in the field.  This alignment was 
reflected in the way our case organisations valued environmental sustainability, 
demonstrated environmental performance improvement, and modified existing reporting 
and operational activities.  These all provided organisational legitimacy in the environmental 
and sustainability arenas.   
 
The emergence of the ESC represented a significant change in the institutional environment, 
magnifying the importance of the government-driven sustainability logic and presenting 
significant coercive pressures via a legal regulatory framework.  Upon aligning their 
commercial logic with the sustainability logic of the government (through actions in water 
conservation, greenhouse emission reduction, and environmental reporting), water 
organisations became reflexively isomorphic in their engagement with stakeholders 
(primarily customers, but also government).  Reflexive isomorphism helps to explain the 
multifaceted and complex nature of processes through which organisations align their 
internal logics and activities with institutional expectations, even in cases where the latter 
are strongly influenced by coercive power of a government regulator.  This shows the 
reflexive interplay of internal organisational logics with external institutional influences, 
encompassing a broad range of legitimating mechanisms.   
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It was posited that water organisations would align their institutional logics through 
environmental performance improvement and by signifying organisational capacity to 
handle environmental uncertainty.  The evidence showed that the water companies tended 
to align their commercial logic with an ‘ensuring community expectations’ logic, that was 
reinforced by the influence of government.  This was done through engaging in particular 
environmental activities and engaging the community in various ways.  Again, however, 
these processes also represented means of reflexive isomorphism in relation to EMA 
adoption.  This emphasises how, while organisational legitimacy is linked to complying with 
the institutional logics of regulators (see Meyer and Rowan, 1977), and “institutional logics 
remain closely aligned to their categories … the unfolding of these categories remains 
flexible to a certain degree” (Brodnik et al., 2017, p. 2311).   
 
Overall, we found that regulatory (coercive) pressures to improve the environmental 
performance of water organisations presented a key impetus for water organisations to 
adopt EMA.  At the same time, commercial and stakeholder logics were significant, and 
water organisations engaged in reflexively isomorphic processes that sought to strategically 
self-legitimate through alignment of internal and field logics.  Thus, institutional influences 
on organisations were supplemented by processes of reflexive isomorphism, through which 
organisations could project their own logics into the field (to which they ostensibly 
responded).   
 
The paper contributes, first, to an understanding of institutional pressures in relation to EMA 
adoption.  The water companies conformed to institutional expectations with regard to 
EMA, and that conformity was fuelled by their resource dependency on coercive institutional 
forces such as the EPA and the ESC.  Customers were the other key stakeholder group, but 
institutional influences in this domain were more complex.   
 
A second area of contribution arises from the analysis of reflexive isomorphism.  The analysis 
in this paper extends research on new institutional sociology in the context of environmental 
accounting.  A fourth type of isomorphic pressure, reflexive isomorphism (originally 
identified as the process of paradigm building in social entrepreneurship – Nicholls, 2010), 
was empirically tested in our research in the context of EMA adoption.  In this study, this 
was most notable in various processes of organisational engagement with customers, 
through which the companies sought to bring customer values into alignment with the 
existing logics of the organisation (including those influenced directly by regulatory forces, 
and the commercial logic of the organisation).  This, in turn, was also reflected in the way the 
case companies refined existing environmental reports, or developed new reporting to the 
NPI, and prepared water plans encompassing environmental and financial information.  This 
research therefore provides evidence the applicability of reflexive isomorphism for aligning 
institutional logics from the field with the institutional logics of individual organisations, in 
the context of endeavours to legitimate organisational actions in adopting EMA. 
 
Third, this paper also contributes to the literature on institutional logics, particularly in the 
analysis of alignment of the logic of individual constituents with that of dominant 
stakeholders.  This contribution particularly responds to a call made by Lansiluoto (2016, p. 
168) to examine “the potential of the institutional logic approach in interpreting 
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management accounting change in general and environmental measures in particular”.  
Furthermore, this research provides evidence of how a dominant stakeholder imposes its 
logic on individual constituents in the field, and how individual organisations respond to 
institutional pressures in the context of broader environmental concerns embracing practice 
change.  Overall, our study has advanced empirical evidence of the development, 
interaction, and impacts of multiple institutional logics in the context of environmental 
accounting.   
 
 
References 
Adams, C.A. (2002), “Internal organisational factors influencing corporate social and ethical 
reporting: Beyond current theorising”, Accounting, Auditing and Accountability 
Journal,Vol. 15 No.2, pp. 223–250. 
Adams, C.A. and McNicholas, P. (2007), “Making a difference: sustainability reporting, 
accountability and organisational change”, Accounting, Auditing and Accountability 
Journal Vol. 20 No. 3, pp. 382–402.   
Ball, A. and Craig, R. (2010), “Using neo-institutionalism to advance social and environmental 
accounting”,  Critical Perspectives on Accounting, Vol. 21 No. 4, pp. 283–293. 
Bartolomeo, M., Bennett, M., Bouma, J.J., Heydkamp, P., James, P. and Wolters, T. 
(2000),“Environmental management accounting in Europe: Current practice and future 
potential”, European Accounting Review, Vol. 9 No. 1, pp. 31–52. 
Barton, A.D. (1999), “A trusteeship theory of accounting for natural capital assets.” Abacus, 
Vol. 35 No. 2, pp. 207–222. 
Brodnik, C., Brown, R. and Cocklin, C. (2017), “The institutional dynamics of stability and 
practice change: The urban water management sector of Australia (1970-2015)”, Water 
Resource Management, Vol. 31 No. 7, pp. 2299–2314.   
Buhr, N. and Freedman, M. (2001), “Culture, institutional factors and differences in 
environmental disclosure between Canada and the United States”, Critical Perspectives on 
Accounting, Vol. 12 No. 3, pp. 293–322. 
Burnett, R.D. and Hansen, D.R. (2008), “Ecoefficiency: Defining a role for environmental cost 
management”, Accounting, Organizations and Society, Vol. 33 No. 6, pp. 551–581. 
Burritt, R. (2004), “Environmental management accounting: roadblocks on the way to the 
green and pleasant land”, Business Strategy and the Environment, Vol. 13 No. 1, pp. 13–
32. 
Burritt, R. (2012), “Environmental performance accountability: planet, people, profits”, 
Accounting, Auditing and Accountability Journal,Vol. 25 No. 2, pp. 370–405. 
Burritt, R.L., Hahn, T. and Schaltegger, S. (2002), “Towards a comprehensive framework for 
environmental management accounting — Links between business actors and 
environmental management accounting tools”, Australian Accounting Review, Vol. 12 No. 
2, pp. 39–50. 
Cashman, A. and Lewis, L. (2007), “Topping up or watering down? Sustainable development 
in the privatized UK water industry”, Business Strategy and the Environment, Vol. 16 No. 
2, pp. 93–105. 
Christ, K.L. (2014), “Water management accounting and the wine supply chain: Empirical 
evidence from Australia”, British Accounting Review, Vol. 46 No. 4, pp. 379–396. 
26 
 
Christ, K.L. and Burritt, R.L. (2017), “Supply chain-oriented corporate water accounting: a 
research agenda”, Sustainability Accounting, Management and Policy Journal, Vol. 8 No. 
2, pp. 216–242.   
Christ, K.L., Burritt, R.L. and Varsei, M. (2016), "Towards environmental management 
accounting for trade-offs", Sustainability Accounting, Management and Policy Journal, 
Vol. 7 No. 3, pp. 428–448. 
Clegg, S. (2010), “The State, power, and agency: Missing in action in institutional 
theory?”Journal of Management Inquiry, Vol. 19 No. 1, pp. 4–13. 
Dillard, J.F., Rigsby, J.T. and Goodman, C. (2004), “The making and remaking of organization 
context: duality and the institutionalization process”, Accounting, Auditing and 
Accountability Journal, Vol. 17 No. 4, pp. 506–542.   
DiMaggio, P.J. and Powell, W.W. (1983), “The iron case revisited: Institutional isomorphism 
and collective rationality in organization fields”, American Sociological Review, Vol. 48 No. 
2, pp. 147–160. 
Egan, M. (2014), “Progress towards institutionalising field-wide water efficiency change”, 
Accounting, Auditing and Accountability Journal, Vol. 27 No. 5, pp. 809–833. 
Ferreira, A., Moulang, C. and Hendro, B. (2010), “Environmental management accounting 
and innovation: an exploratory analysis”, Accounting, Auditing and Accountability Journal, 
Vol. 23 No.7, pp. 920–948. 
Frost, G. and Seamer, M. (2002), “Adoption of environmental reporting and management 
practices: an analysis of New South Wales public sector”, Financial Accountability and 
Management, Vol. 18 No.2, pp. 103–127. 
Fuenfschilling, L. and Truffer, B. (2014), “The structuration of socio-technical regimes—
Conceptual foundations from institutional theory”, Research Policy, Vol. 43, pp. 772–791. 
Fuenfschilling, L. and Truffer, B. (2016), “The interplay of institutions, actors, and 
technologies in socio-technical systems – An analysis of transformations in the Australian 
urban water sector”, Technological Forecasting and Social Change, Vol. 103, pp. 298–312. 
Gibassier, D. (2017), “From ecobilan to LCA: the elite’s institutional work in the creation of 
an environmental management accounting tool”, Critical Perspective on Accounting, Vol. 
42, pp. 36–58. 
Gibassier, D. and Alcouffe, S. (2018).  “Environmental management accounting: The missing 
link to sustainability?” Social and Environmental Accountability Journal, Vol. 38 No. 1, pp. 
1–18. 
Gibassier, D. and Schaltegger, S. (2015), “Carbon management accounting and reporting in 
practice – a case study on converging emergent approaches”, Sustainability Accounting, 
Management and Policy Journal, Vol. 6 No. 3, pp. 340–365. 
Gray, R., Adams, C.A. and Owen, D. (2014), Accountability, Social Responsibility and 
Sustainability: Accounting for Society and the Environment.  Pearson, UK.   
Gray, R., Owen, D. and Adams, C. (2009), “Some theories for social accounting?: A review 
essay and tentative pedagogic categorisation of theorisations around social accounting”, 
In Martin Freedman & BikkiJaggi (Eds.),  Sustainability, Environmental Performance and 
Disclosures (Advances in Environmental Accounting & Management, Volume 4), pp. 1 – 
54.   
Green, K., Morton, B. and New, S. (1996), “Purchasing and environmental management: 
interactions, policies and opportunities”, Business Strategy and the Environment, Vol. 5 
No. 3, pp. 188–197. 
27 
 
Green, R., Diaz, A.M., Li, S.X. and Lorente, J.C. (2010), “The multiplicity of institutional logics 
and the heterogeneity of organizational responses”, Organization Science, Vol. 21 No. 2, 
pp. 521–539. 
Haque, S. and Deegan, C. (2010), “Corporate climate change-related governance practices 
and related disclosures: evidence from Australia”, Australian Accounting Review, Vol. 20 
No. 4, pp. 317–333.   
Hart, S.L. and Ahuja, G. (1996), “Does it pay to be green? An empirical examination of the 
relationship between emission reduction and firm performance”, Business Strategy and 
the Environment, Vol. 5 No. 1, pp. 30–37. 
Herzig, C., Viere, T., Schaltegger, S. and Burritt, R.L. (2012), Environmental Management 
Accounting: Case Studies of South-East Asian Companies, Routledge, Abingdon.   
Hopwood, A.G. and Miller, P. (1994), Accounting as social and institutional practice.  
Cambridge University Press.  Cambridge, UK. 
Hörisch, J., Ortas, E., Schaltegger, S. and Álvarez, I. (2015), “Environmental effects of 
sustainability management tools: An empirical analysis of large companies” Ecological 
Economics, Vol. 120, pp. 241–249.   
Ilinitch, A.Y., Soderstrom, N.S. and Thomas, T.E. (1998), “Measuring corporate environmental 
performance”, Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, Vol. 17, pp. 383–408. 
Jӓrvinen, J.T. (2016), “Role of management accounting in applying new institutional logics – a 
comparative case study in the non-profit sector”, Accounting, Auditing and Accountability 
Journal, Vol. 29 No. 5, pp. 861–886.   
Johnston, A. and Smith, A. (2001), “The characteristics and features of corporate 
environmental performance indicators – a case study of the water industry of England 
and Wales”, Eco-Management and Auditing, Vol. 1 No. 1, pp. 1–11. 
Kamal, O., Brown, D., Sivabalan, P. and Sundin, H. (2015), “Accounting information and 
shifting stakeholder salience: an industry level approach”, Qualitative Research in 
Accounting and Management, Vol. 12 No. 2, pp. 172–200. 
Kokubu, K. and Nakajima, M. (2004), “Sustainability accounting initiatives in Japan – pilot 
project of material flow cost accounting”, in Eco-efficiency and Beyond: Towards the 
Sustainable Enterprise, Jan-Dirk, S., Christa, L. and Ernst, U.V.W. (eds.), Greenleaf 
Publishing, Sheffield, pp. 100–112. 
Lander, M.W., Koene, B.A.S and Linssen, S.N. (2013), “Committed to professionalism: 
Organizational responses of mid-tier accounting firms to conflicting institutional logics”, 
Accounting, Organizations and Society, Vol. 38, pp. 130–148. 
Lansiluoto, M.J.A. (2016), “Collective identity, institutional logic and environmental 
management accounting change”, Journal of Accounting & Organizational Change, Vol. 
12 No. 2, pp. 152–176. 
Larrinaga-Gonzalez, C., Carrasco-Fenech, F., Caro-Gonzalez, F.J., Correa-Ruiz, C. and Paez-
Sandubete, J.M. (2001), “The role of environmental accounting in organizational change- 
An exploration of Spanish companies”, Accounting, Auditing and Accountability Journal, 
Vol. 14 No. 2, pp. 213–239.   
Larrinaga-Gonzelez, C. and Perez-Chamorro, V. (2008), “Sustainability Accounting and 
Accountability in Public Water Companies”, Public Money & Management, Vol. 28 No. 6, 
pp. 337–343. 
Lauesen, L.M. (2014), “How well are water companies engaged in CSR? A critical cross-
geographical discourse analysis”, Social Responsibility Journal, Vol. 10 No. 1, pp. 115–136. 
28 
 
Lounsbury, M. (2007), “A tale of two cities: competing logics and practical variation in the 
professionalizing of mutual funds”, Academy of Management Journal, Vol. 50 No.2, pp. 
289–307. 
Lounsbury, M. (2008), “Institutional rationality and practice variation: New directions in the 
institutional analysis of practice”, Accounting, Organizations and Society, Vol. 33 Nos. 4–5, 
pp. 349–361. 
McDonald-Kerr, L. (2017), “Water, water, everywhere: using silent accounting to examine 
accountability for a desalination project”, Sustainability Accounting, Management and 
Policy Journal, Vol. 8 No. 1, pp. 43–76. 
McKay, J. (2006), “Issues of CEOs of water utilities with the implementation of Australian 
water laws”, Journal of Contemporary Water Research and Education, Vol. 135 No. 1, pp. 
115–130. 
Meyer, J.W. and Rowan, B. (1977), “Institutionalized organizations: Formal structures as 
myth and ceremony”, American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 83 No. 2, pp. 340–363. 
Miles, M.B. and Huberman, A.M. (1994), Qualitative data analysis: An expanded sourcebook, 
Sage, Thousand Oaks. 
Miller, P. (1994), “Accounting as social and institutional practice: an introduction”, in 
Hopwood, A.G., & Miller, P. (Eds.), Accounting as social and institutional practice, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, pp. 1–39. 
Mitchell, R.K., Agle, B.R. and Wood, D.J. (1997), “Toward a theory of stakeholder 
identification and salience: Defining the principle of who and what really counts”, 
Academy of Management Review, Vol. 22 No. 4, pp. 853–886. 
Moore, D. (2008),  “Transformation of the Australian public sector and environmental 
accounting practices: the case of water in 2001”,  Australasian Accounting Business and 
Finance Journal, Vol. 2 No. 1, pp. 60–81. 
Narayanan, V. and Adams, C.A. (2017), “Transformative change towards sustainability: the 
interaction between organizational discourses and organizational practices”, Accounting 
and Business Research, Vol. 47 No. 3, pp. 344–368. 
National Competition Council (1998), Compendium of National Competition Policy 
Agreement, Second Edition, AGPS, Canberra. 
Nicholls, A. (2010), “The legitimacy of social entrepreneurship: reflexive isomorphism in a 
pre-paradigmatic field”, Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, Vol. 34 No. 4, pp. 611–
633. 
Norris, G. and O’Dwyer, B. (2004), “Motivating socially responsive decision making: the 
operation of management controls in a socially responsive organization”, The British 
Accounting Review, Vol. 36 No. 2, pp. 173–196. 
Ocasio, W. (1997), “Towards an attention-based view of the firm”, Strategic Management 
Journal, Vol. 18, pp. 187–206.   
Parliament of Victoria (2001, November), Inquiry into the Allocation of Water Resources.  
Environment and Natural Resource Committee, Parliament of Victoria, Melbourne. 
Phan, T., Baird, K.  and Su, S. (2017), “The use and effectiveness of environmental 
management accounting”, Australasian Journal of Environmental Management, Vol. 24 
No. 4, pp. 355–374. 
Qian, W., Hörisch, J & Schaltegger, S. (2018), “Environmental management accounting and 
its effects on carbon management and disclosure quality”, Journal of Cleaner 
Production, Vol. 174, pp. 1608–1619 
29 
 
Qian, W. and Schaltegger, S. (2017), “Revisiting carbon disclosure and performance: 
legitimacy and management view”, The British Accounting Review, Vol. 49, pp. 365–379.   
Qian, W., Burritt, R. and Monroe, G. (2011), “Environmental management accounting in local 
government – A case of waste management”, Accounting, Auditing and Accountability 
Journal, Vol. 24 No. 1, pp. 93–128. 
Rautiainen, A., Urquía-Grande, E. and Muñoz-Colomina, C. (2017), “Institutional Logics in 
Police Performance Indicator Development: A comparative Case Study of Spain and 
Finland”, European Accounting Review, Vol. 26 No. 2, pp. 165–191 
Schaltegger, S. and Burritt, R. (2000), Contemporary Environmental Accounting: Issues, 
Concepts and Practice, Greenleaf Publishing Limited: Sheffield. 
Schaltegger, S. and Hӧrisch, J. (2017), “In search of the dominant rationale in sustainability 
management: legitimacy – or profit-seeking”, Journal of Business Ethics, Vol. 145 No. 2, 
pp. 259–276. 
Scott, W. (2008), Institutions and organizations: Ideas and interests.  Sage, Thousand Oaks. 
Thornton, P.H. (2002), “The rise of the corporation in a craft industry: conflict and 
conformity in institutional logics”, Academy of Management Journal, Vol. 45 No. 1, pp. 
81–101. 
Thornton, P.H. and Ocasio, W. (1999), “Institutional logics and the historical contingency of 
power in organizations: executive succession in the higher education publishing industry, 
1958-1990”, American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 105 No. 3, pp. 801–843. 
Thornton, P.H., Ocasio, W. and Lounsbury, M. (2012), The institutional logics perspective: a 
new approach to culture, structure, and process, Oxford University Press, Oxford and New 
York. 
Tucker, B. and Parker, L.  D. (2015), “Business as usual? An institutional view of the 
relationship between management control systems and strategy”, Financial 
Accountability and Management, Vol. 31 No. 2, pp. 113–149.   
Werbeloff, L., Brown, R. and Cocklin, C. (2017), “Institutional change to support regime 
transformation: Lessons from Australia’s water sector”, Water Resources Research, Vol. 
53, pp. 5845–5859.   
Wijethilake, C., Munir, R. and Appuhami, R. (2017), “Strategic responses to institutional 
pressures for sustainability: The role of management control systems”, Accounting, 
Auditing and Accountability Journal, Vol. 30 No. 8, pp. 1677–1710.   
Xie, S. and Hayase, K. (2007), “Corporate Environmental Performance Evaluation: a 
Measurement Model and a New Concept”, Business Strategy and the Environment, Vol. 
16 No. 2, pp. 148–168. 
Zhang, G., Boyce, G. and Ahmed, K. (2014), “Institutional changes in university accounting 
education in post-revolutionary China: From political orientation to internationalization”, 
Critical Perspectives on Accounting, Vol. 25 No. 8, pp. 819–843. 
 
30 
 
Table 1: Profile of case organisations 
Organisation 
Revenue 
($’000) 7 
Employees 
Net Profit 
($’000) 
Total 
Assets 
($’000) 
Population 
served 
Area 
covered 
(km2) 
Type of 
customers 
served 
Type of Services 
Pacific Water 60,000 150 5,000 505,000 141,000 3,000 
Regional urban 
(non-
metropolitan) 
Water and 
sewerage services 
Atlantic Water 47,000 140 4,000 487,000 99,000 20,000 Regional  
Water and 
sewerage services 
Central Water 848,000 820 230,000 8,948,000 3,638,000 8,000 
Metropolitan 
retail water 
business 
Catchment, service 
reservoir and 
treatment plant 
management 
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Table 2: Summary profile of interviewees 
 Position designation  Time in organisation 
P
ac
if
ic
 W
at
e
r 
GM, Commercial Services Not disclosed 
Manager Assets Not disclosed 
Senior Environmental Engineer 6 years 
GM, Sustainability 14 years 
Manager, Finance 3½ years 
Manager, Renewable Resources 7 years 
Manager, Organisational Development and Risk 2 years 
Manager, Water System  2 years 
Manager, Capital Investment 6 years 
MD 8 years 
GM, Customer and Community Relations 2 years 
Senior Financial Accountant 8 years 
C
e
n
tr
al
 
W
at
e
r 
Project Manager, Environmental Regulation and Reporting Officer 18 years 
GM, Business Services 28 years 
Team Leader, Sustainability Strategic Planning 2½ years  
Manager, Corporate Strategy 23 years 
A
tl
an
ti
c 
W
at
e
r 
Manager Financial Reporting 2½ years 
Re-use Co-ordinator 10 years 
Executive Manager, Corporate Strategy 7 months 
Manager, Sustainability and Environment 4 years 
Chief Operating Officer 5 years 
Chief Financial Officer 10 years 
Strategy and Development Manager 15 years 
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Table 3: Physical EMA disclosures in annual reports (2001–2010) 
Category 
Physical or qualitative  
information disclosures 
Case organisation 
Pacific Water  Atlantic Water  Central Water  
n (years) n (years) n (years) 
P
ro
d
u
ct
 o
u
tp
u
t 
1. Volumeofwater purchased 
1  
(10) 
3  
(05,06,09) 
0 
2. Volume of water extracted 
3  
(07,08,09) 
9  
(02,03,04,05,06,07,08,09,10) 
3  
(06,07,09) 
3. Volume of chemicals used 
for water treatment 
0 
3  
(08,09,10) 
0 
4. Volume of energy/electricity 
used for water and 
wastewater treatment 
4  
(03,05,06,07) 
3  
(08,09,10) 
3  
(06,07,10) 
Total 8 18 6 
% of total  15.38% 31.57% 14.39% 
N
o
n
-p
ro
d
u
ct
 o
u
tp
u
t 1. Volume of water loss 
8  
(02,03,05,06,07,08,09,10) 
8 
(02,03,04,06,07,08,09,10) 
2 
(08,09) 
2. Volume of chemical used 
related to water loss 
0 0 0 
3. Volume of electricity used 
related to water loss 
0 0 0 
Total 8 8 2 
% of total  15.38% 14.03% 4.76% 
W
as
te
 f
lo
w
s 
1. Volume of water recycled 
9  
(02,03,04,05,06,07,08,09,10) 
6  
(02,03,04,05,06,07) 
10  
(01,02,03,04,05,06,07,08,09,10) 
2. Volume of recycled water 
reused 
6  
(04,05,06,08,09,10) 
10 
(01,02,03,04,05,06,07,08,09,10) 
10 
(01,02,03,04,05,06,07,08,09,10) 
3. Volume of potable water 
substituted with RW/saved 
6  
(04,06,07,08,09,10) 
1  
(10) 
3  
(04,08,10) 
4. Volume of bio-solids 7 4  2  
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recycled and reused  (03,05,06,07,08,09,10) (07,08,09,10) (03,04) 
Total 28 21 25 
% of total  53.84% 36.84% 59.52% 
Ex
te
rn
al
it
ie
s 
1. Emissions generated by 
operations 
5  
(06,07,08,09,10) 
8  
(03,04,05,06,07,08,09,10) 
6  
(03,05,07,08,09,10) 
2. Damage to river health from 
operations 
2  
(08,10) 
2  
(01,06) 
2  
(06,10) 
3. Environmental benefits from 
water recycling 
0 0 0 
4. Environmental benefits from 
bio-solids reuse 
1 
(08) 
0 0 
5. Loss of bio-diversity from 
operations 
0 0 
1 
(07) 
Total 8 10 9 
% of total  15.38% 17.54% 21.43% 
Total across all categories 52 57 43 
% of total 34.21% 37.5% 28.29% 
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Table 4: Monetary EMA disclosures in annual reports (2001–2010) 
Category 
Monetary  
information disclosures 
Case organisation 
Pacific Water  Atlantic Water  Central Water  
n (years) n (years) n (years) 
P
ro
d
u
ct
 o
u
tp
u
t 
1. Costs ofwater purchased 4 (06,08,09,10) 0 0 
2. Costs of water extracted 0 0 0 
3. Costs of chemicals for 
treatment* 
8 (02,03,04,05,06,07,08,09) 0 0 
4. Costs of energy/electricity 
for treatment* 
0 0 0 
Total 12 0 0 
N
o
n
-p
ro
d
u
ct
 
o
u
tp
u
t 
1. Costs of water loss 0 0 0 
2. Costs of chemical related to 
water loss 
0 0 0 
3. Costs of electricity related to 
water loss 
0 0 0 
Total 0 0 0 
W
as
te
 f
lo
w
s 
1. Capital costs of water 
recycling 
6 (04,05,07,08,09,10) 1 (07) 1 (10) 
2. Operating costs of water 
recycling 
5 (05,07,08,09,10) 0 0 
3. Proceeds from recycled 
water 
6 (05,06,07,08,09,10) 1 (10) 0 
4. Expenditure related to bio-
solids recycled 
0 0 0 
5. Monetary benefits from bio-
solids reuse 
0 0 0 
Total 17 2 1 
In
d
ir
ec
t 
co
st
s 1. R&D costs related to water 
loss reduction 
0 0 0 
35 
 
2. R&D costs for increasing 
recycled water and bio-solids 
use 
0 0 0 
3. R&D costs for emission 
reduction 
0 0 0 
4. Administrative costs for 
environmental management 
0 0 0 
5. Environmental contribution 6 (05,06,07,08,09,10) 6 (05,06,07,08,09,10) 6 (05,06,07,08,09,10) 
Total 6 6 6 
 
Ex
te
rn
al
it
ie
s 
    
1. Costs associated with 
reduction of emissions 
0 0 0 
2. Costs associated with 
improving river health 
0 0 4 (04,06,07,10) 
3. Costs associated with 
controlling toxic and odorous 
from treatment process 
0 0 1 (09) 
4. Costs associated with 
protecting bio-diversity 
1 (08) 0 1 (08) 
Total 1 0 6 
Total across all categories 36 8 13 
* Treatment includes both water and wastewater treatment.   
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Table 5: Environmental performance disclosures in annual reports (2001–2010) 
Perspective  Disclosure Items 
Case organisation 
Pacific Water  Atlantic Water  Central Water  
n (years) n (years) n (years) 
O
rg
an
is
at
io
n
al
 s
ys
te
m
 d
ev
el
o
p
m
en
t 
1. Strengthening EMS 6 (05,06,07,08,09,10) 5 (01,02,08,09,10) 4 (07,08,09,10) 
2. Environmental policy or mission 
statement 
1 (05) 2 (02,03) 2 (07,10) 
3. Responsibility of board of directors 
committee responsible for 
environmental policy 
1 (07) 0 7 (04,05,06,07,08,09,10) 
4. Environmental performance* as a 
factor of executive compensation 
0 0 0 
5. Environmental audit 1 (07) 2 (08,09) 0 
6. R&D for environmental 
performance improvement 
3 (04,06,07) 1 (01) 8 (02,03,04,05,06,07,09,10) 
7. Employee training for 
environmental performance 
improvements 
1(07) 1 (09) 1 (09) 
Total 13 11 22 
% of total  17.81% 16.42% 23.16% 
St
ak
eh
o
ld
er
 
8. The involvement of government, 
customer, community, supplier 
and industry for environmental 
performance improvement 
8 (01,04,05,06,07,08,09,10) 7 (03,05,06,07,08,09,10) 
10 
(01,02,03,04,05,06,07,08,0
9,10) 
9. The performance of activities (e.g.  
tree plantation) to protect 
biodiversity 
8 (03,04,05,06,07,08,09,10) 8 (03,04,05,06,07,08,09,10) 8 (03,04,05,06,07,08,09,10) 
10. The performance of resource 
(paper, water and energy) use by 
Employee and achievementagainst 
1 (10) 2 (08,10) 3 (08,09,10) 
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the target. 
 
11. The activity to protect or improve 
river/creek health 
6 (05,06,07,08,09,10) 7 (03,04,05,06,08,09,10) 
10 
(01,02,03,04,05,06,07,08,0
9,10) 
Total 23 24 31 
% of total  31.51% 35.82% 32.63% 
St
ra
te
gi
es
 
12. The initiatives of increasing energy 
efficient project/ equipment 
4 (05,08,09,10) 2 (04,10) 5 (05,06,07,09,10) 
13. The performance of increasing 
renewable energy 
1 (09) 0 7 (02,03,06,07,08,09,10) 
14. The redesign of process of 
delivering services for 
environmental performance 
improvement 
3 (07,09,10) 0 2 (08,10) 
15. The target of environment 
friendlycar use and achievement 
against the target 
0 0 1 (03) 
Total 8 2 15 
% of total  10.96% 2.91% 15.79% 
In
p
u
t–
o
u
tp
u
t 
16. The performance of water 
consumption by customer 
8 (03,04,05,06,07,08,09,10) 5 (01,06,07,09,10) 2 (08,10) 
17. The performance of reducing 
electricity use 
0 1 (06) 1 (08) 
18. The performance of water loss 
reduction 
5 (05,06,08,09,10) 2 (08,10) 3 (04,05,10) 
19. The performance of greenhouse 
gas emissions reduction      
3 (07,09,10) 3 (08,09,10) 7 (03,05,06,07,08,09,10) 
20. The performance of recycled water 
reuse 
6 (05,06,07,08,09,10) 7 (02,03,04,05,06,07,10) 6 (05,06,07,08,09,10) 
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21. The target of bio-solids recycled 
and reuse and achievement against 
the target 
4 (06,07,09,10) 7 (02,03,04,06,07,09,10) 7 (03,04,06,07,08,09,10) 
22. The performance of trade waste 
management 
3 (05,08,09) 5 (03,06,08,09,10) 0 
23. The target of solid waste (from 
office and contractor activity) 
recycled and achievement against 
the target 
0 0 1 (10) 
Total 29 30 27 
% of total  39.73% 44.78% 28.42% 
Total across all categories 73 67 95 
* Environmental performance in all cases refers to minimisingcustomer consumption of treated drinking water, minimising water loss through 
supply and operation, ensuring quality of discharge into sewage and waterways, maximizing recycled water use, greenhouse gas reduction, 
protecting bio-diversity, and improving river health. 
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Table 6: Key coercive factors motivating adoption of EMA 
Coercive Factor Pacific Atlantic Central 
Emergence of Essential Services 
Commission (ESC) 
x   
Environment Protection Act 
1970 
 x  
Environment Protection 
Authority licensing agreement 
x  x 
National Greenhouse and 
Energy Reporting Act 2007 
(NGER Act) 
 x  
Statement of Obligation x  x 
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Table 7: Transformation of institutional logics to individual constituents of the field and organisational responses  
Government Logic  Driver of logic transformation  Organisational response  Organisational logic 
Pacific Water 
Sustainability logic Statement of Obligation 
 
Water conservation and greenhouse gas 
emissions reduction 
Commercial logic 
Environmental Protection Authority licensing 
agreement 
EPA Licensing 
Reporting to ESC Refining existing environmental reports 
Ensuring 
community 
expectations logic 
Protecting community interests Engaging community groups in decision 
making processes 
Supply security in times of uncertainty Potable water substitution 
Atlantic Water 
Sustainability logic The Environmental Protection Act 1970 (EPAct) 
- Environmental Protection Policies 
- EPA Licensing 
Environmental Management System (EMS) in 
corporate licence 
Commercial logic 
National Greenhouse and Energy Reporting Act 
2007 (NGER Act) 
Reporting through the National Pollutant 
Inventory 
Ensuring 
community 
expectations logic 
Community environmental concerns Engaging community in project 
implementation process – particularly 
environmental monitoring 
Community forums 
Reporting potential impacts of climate change 
on water system 
Central Water 
Sustainability logic Environmental Protection Authority licensing 
agreement  
- Minimising environmental impact 
Monitoring the flows of sewerage discharge 
into waterways 
Commercial logic 
Statement of Obligation 
 
Preparing Water plan encompassing 
environmental and financial information 
Ensuring Prosecution by EPA in case of environmental Progressively bringing environmental focus 
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community 
expectations logic 
degradation  into line with customer values 
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Table 8: Regulatory changes in mid-2000s influencing EMA adoption 
Year Regulatory Change 
2004 
The Essential Services Commissions (ESC) extended its role in 2004 to 
include regulation regarding Victorian water and sewerage services  
encompassing pricing, service standard and market conduct. 
2004 
The amendment of the Water Industry Act 1994 by Water Industry 
(Environmental Contribution) Act 2004. 
2007 
The emergence of the National Greenhouse and Energy Reporting (NGER) 
Act 2007 necessitated the capture, understanding and reporting of 
greenhouse gas emissions that were previously reported, along with other 
National Pollutant Inventory (NPI) substances, under NPI NEPM Act.  With 
the emergence of the NGER Act 2007, emission reporting gained 
momentum in the Victorian water industry.   
2007 
Environmental Protection Authority licensing agreement in 2007 illustrates 
a sustainability commitment, process and priorities to increase the 
sustainability and resource efficiency of business operations. 
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Figure 1: Environmental performance disclosure (EPD) and EMA information disclosure 
(Aggregate for the three case organisations, 2001–2010 
 – based on data displayed in Tables 3–5) 
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1 New institutionalism, or new institutional sociology (NIS), as applied in the accounting literature (see Miller, 
1994) proposes that organisations tend to conform to societal norms of acceptable practice to ensure their 
survival vis-à-vis external social legitimacy.  The use of this approach within accounting research has been partly 
driven by acknowledged weakness an economics of internal organisation perspective.  For example, in the 
management accounting context, the economics of internal organisation fails to fully conceptualise how decision 
makers understand decision situations.  Political, social and cultural factors are not captured in the economics of 
internal organisations; however, they are as important as the economic equilibrium (Hopwood and Miller, 1994). 
 
2 The Victorian state government in Australia is the only shareholder for the State’s water corporations, making 
the case organisations in the present study dependent upon government for resources, and presenting a 
potentially important form of coercive institutional pressure (see Adams and McNicholas (2007) for a reflection 
on what this means for environmental reporting). 
 
3 Multiple occurrences were not counted, as it was the presence or absence of particular themes that was of 
interest.  Thus, a similar approach to “redundant information” was taken to that of Buhr and Freedman (2001) in 
the sense that multiple occurrences carried no additional information value in terms of this study. 
 
4 Nine interviewees out of thirteen commented on some form of regulatory requirements for improved 
environmental performance and four interviewees referred to the sustainability issues in SOO.   
 
5 Information obtained from the Atlantic Water website.  
 
6 See, Fuenfschilling and Truffer (2014) for a discussion of community, professional, and market challenges 
faced by state and public water utilities, as the most important decision-making actors in water sector. 
 
7 Figures have been rounded. 
